

sponsored by



Bright Ideas<sup>®</sup>  
Projects 39



RHODES UNIVERSITY  
*Where leaders learn*



# A less attack-prone, Internet deployment of iLanga

Researcher: Courage Radu

Email: [g11r3764@campus.ru.ac.za](mailto:g11r3764@campus.ru.ac.za)

Supervisor : M. Tsietsi

Co-Supervisor : A. Terzoli



# Outline


- 1) Background
- 2) Motivation
- 3) Threats
- 4) Approach
- 5) Asterisk security
- 6) Conclusion
- 7) Possible extensions
- 8) Questions and answers



## Background

- iLanga is an open computer based telecommunication system
- Objective of project is to have a securely deployed iLanga
- A guide with best security practices
- Developed a web based UI to easy up security administration

# Background



# Background

- Ubuntu Linux – operating system
- Asterisk – software implementation of a PBX
- Kamailio – proxy server for authentication
- MySQL – database to store user information





# Motivation

- The system uses open source software
- The system can be deployed at tertiary institutions, small business enterprises, etc
- Affordable hardware extensions
- Security is not inherently enabled and configured by default

# Threats

- Brute force attack – password guessing
  - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) brute force

```
[Nov 6 02:57:48] NOTICE[18681]: chan_sip.c:21687 handle_request_register:  
Registration from "'9964"<sip:9964@146.231.121.132>' failed for  
'85.14.178.21' - No matching peer found
```

```
[Nov 6 02:57:48] NOTICE[18681]: chan_sip.c:21687 handle_request_register:  
Registration from "'9965"<sip:9965@146.231.121.132>' failed for  
'85.14.178.21' - No matching peer found
```

- Root account brute force

June 16 12:16

```
Failed password for root from 95.141.193.46 about 40 attempts  
Failed password for invalid user test from 95.141.193.46 3 attempts  
Failed password for invalid user nagios 2 attempts  
Failed password for invalid user postgres 2 attempts  
Failed password for invalid user oracle 1 attempt
```

# Threats


- Toll fraud
  - unauthorised long distance calls

"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-00000003	DAHDI/1-1	Dial	DAHDI/1/00251116610588 20 r
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-00000006	DAHDI/1-1	Hangup	
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-00000009	DAHDI/1-1	Hangup	
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-0000000c	DAHDI/1-1	Dial	DAHDI/1/00251116612354 20 r
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-0000000f	DAHDI/1-1	Hangup	
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-00000012	DAHDI/1-1	Dial	DAHDI/1/005372042516 20 r
"asterisk" <asterisk>	SIP/91.223.89.51-00000015	DAHDI/1-1	Dial	DAHDI/1/002204495134 20 r

- Dos
  - service disruption



# Approach





## Preliminary phases

- Current state-of-art of the system
  - documenting versions for each component
- Replicated the system
- Learning the system
  - how asterisk handles phone calls
  - how the components are integrated

# Asterisk security

- Install Asterisk PBX as non-root
  - a remote security compromise should not be used to take over the entire machine
- Set the variable **alwaysauthreject = yes**
  - prevent attacker from scanning for valid usernames
- Change Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) default port 5060
  - change default port to any unused random port number

## Asterisk security (Cont.)

- Use public key authentication for SSH login
  - disable password authentication
- Secure dialplan
  - properly designed dialplan prevent tool fraud
  - well programmed dialplan will prevent dialplan injection
  - a secured default context will not cost the organisation

## Asterisk security (Cont.)


- Perl script

- ban IP address with more than 6 wrong passwords

```
19  if ($line =~ m/\'' failed for \''(.*)\'' - Wrong password/) {
20      push(@failhost,$1);
21  }
22  if ($line =~ m/\'' failed for \''(.*)\'' - No matching peer found/) {
23      push(@failhost,$1);
24  }
25  if ($line =~ m/\'' failed for \''(.*)\'' - Device does not match ACL/) {
26      push(@failhost,$1);
27  }
28  if ($line =~ m/\'' failed for \''(.*)\'' - Peer is not supposed to register/) {
29      push(@failhost,$1);
30  }
```

# Asterisk security (Cont.)

- Perl script monitors DoS and password strength for legitimate users



The screenshot shows the Asterisk Realtime DoS monitoring interface. The left sidebar contains 'System Status' and 'Realtime DoS' sections. The main area is titled 'Monitoring Denial of Service' and 'Monitor for denial of service'. It includes a legend for 'Not blocked' (green dot) and 'Blocked' (red dot). A table lists three extensions: 6000 (IP: 146.231.123.15, Username: courage, Password Strength: very weak), 6001 (IP: 146.231.124.25, Username: Mos, Password Strength: very strong), and 6002 (IP: 146.231.124.47, Username: Alfredo, Password Strength: very weak). The 'Password Strength' column is highlighted with a red box.

Extension	IP Address	Username	Password Strength
6000	146.231.123.15	courage	very weak
6001	146.231.124.25	Mos	very strong
6002	146.231.124.47	Alfredo	very weak

# Asterisk security (Cont.)

Blocked IP Addresses


List of blocked IP addresses and number of attempts

No	IP Address	Attempts
1	140.231.124.47	65
2	140.231.123.15	127750
3	140.231.124.25	334

Administrator




Username + Password



## Video Demonstration

- Scenario – an intruder want to enumerate usernames and crack passwords on iLanga
  - perl script is running in background
  - the administrator should view the blocked IP address via the browser







## Results

- Intrusion prevention script effectively quarantines offending IP addresses
- Sipvicious tool can generate an average of 170 password attempts per second on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU @ 2.93GHz



## Conclusion

- Open source software empower institutions and small organisations to deploy communication systems like iLanga
- iLanga brings different components together but we have to configure and enhance security features in it
- Create an image with necessary security features pre-enabled and distribute it to other institutions (UFH and NMMU)



## Possible extensions

- Extension of the UI so that the administrator can view all security information.
- The security information is scattered everywhere within the system.
- The interface should be able to lighten the burden for non-linux experts.

# Questions and Answers

